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Abstract
This paper studies the interaction between tax evasion and wage endogeneity within a
Mirrleesian optimal tax framework. It characterizes the optimal marginal income tax
rates on the skilled and the unskilled workers and the optimal amount of resources to be
spent on deterring tax evasion. It shows that tax evasion weakens the incentives for the
government to manipulate the marginal tax rates for the purpose of exploiting general
equilibrium e¤ects on wages. Moreover, the extent of this depends on the curvature of
the evasion cost function. It also argues that marginal income tax rates are likely to be
higher when the government attempts to deter evasion.
JEL classication: H21, H26.
Keywords: Nonlinear income taxation; endogenous wages; income-misreporting; tax
administration; redistribution.
1 Introduction
Nearly ve decades has past since Allingham and Sandmo (1972) formulated the rst
formal model of tax evasion in the economics discipline. A vast literature has since
emerged expanding the subject into numerous directions. 1 One strand, to which this
paper belongs, has sought to integrate tax evasion into the optimal income tax litera-
ture with variable labor supply. What distinguishes the current paper from the previous
papers is that it allows for imperfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled work-
ers and the endogeneity of their wages. Previous studies have followed the traditional
optimal income tax models that assume wages are exogenously determined.2
Endogeneity of wages matters and not just for its realism; it opens up a second
channel for redistribution. The change in the relative gross-of-tax wages, arising from
government tax policies, plays as important a factor in income distribution as taxation
itself (which aims to change the relative net-of-tax wages). These general equilibrium
changes can very well reduce the burden of distortionary redistributive taxes. The point
is that highly increasing marginal income tax rates leads to decreasing labor supplies of
the higher-skilled workers. In turn, this will lead to an increase in the gross-of-tax wage
rate of the higher-skilled relative to lower-skilled workers. By opting for a less increasing
marginal income tax rate schedule, one can mitigate this perverse redistributive e¤ect
of taxation.
1See, e.g., Cremer et al. (1990), Cremer and Gahvari (1994, 1996, 2000), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002) for a survey.
2Even though Stiglitz (1982) included a section on wage endogeneity in his two-group formulation
of the optimum general income tax, the vast body of this general literature has focused on the original
Mirrleesian assumption of xed wages. Stiglitz (1985), Naito (1999), Huber (1999), Pirttilä and Tuomala
(2002), Blackorby and Brett (2004), Micheletto (2004), Gaube (2005), Gahvari (2014) and Bastani et
al. (2015) are among the exceptions.
Starting with Sandmo (1981), the contributors to the optimal income taxation literature in the pres-
ence of tax evasion have generally simplied the problem by restricting the income tax schedule to
be linear. Cremer and Gahvari (1996) and Schroyen (1997) have reconsidered the problem within the
Mirrleesian general income tax framework. However, all writers in this area have assumed that wages
are constant. Thus far, to the best of our knowledge, nobody has considered tax evasion within the
general income tax framework that allows for wage endogeneity.
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The di¤erence that wage endogeneity makes for the optimal marginal income tax
rates was demonstrated by Stiglitz (1982, 1987) in his two-group model. One was that
a marginal income subsidy on the high-skilled agents replaces the no-distortion-at-the-
top recommendation. Secondly, while the marginal tax rate on the low-skilled is always
positive, its magnitude depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two types
of labor. The smaller the elasticity of substitution, the larger should be the marginal
tax rate with the government increasingly relying on the changes in the gross-of-tax
wages to redistribute income. These modication to the characterization of the optimal
marginal income tax rates are meant to bring about an increase in the labor supply ratio
of the high-skilled relative to the low-skilled workers and a decrease in their relative
wages.
This paper focuses on the implications of tax evasion for the optimal marginal income
tax rates, particularly the component that reects the change in the relative gross-of-tax
wages. Prior studies on optimal taxation and tax evasion have neglected this specic
question. To keep things simple, we adopt the riskless approach to evasion introduced
in the literature by Usher (1986) and has since been used in a number of subsequent
contributions.3 It assumes taxpayers are able to fully avoid detection by incurring a
cost that depends on the amount they misreport. In this way, we can focus on the
implication of tax evasion for the marginal income tax rates that are exclusively due to
the endogeneity of wages.
We append a production function, with skilled and unskilled workers as inputs, to
the two-group model of Stiglitz. The inputs are imperfect substitutes so that wages of
the two inputs are determined endogenously. The economic environment is competitive
and wages reect the value of marginal product. Specifying the evasion cost as a smooth
convex function of the amount of evaded income, we characterize the optimal marginal
income tax rates faced by the two types of workers. The rst lesson we learn from this
3See, e.g., Mayshar (1991), Boadway et al. (1994), Kopczuk (2001), Slemrod (2001), Christiansen
and Tuomala (2008), Chetty (2009), Gahvari and Micheletto (2014), and Blomquist et al. (2016).
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exercise is that tax evasion weakens the incentives for the government to manipulate
marginal income tax rates for the purpose of exploiting general equilibrium e¤ects on
wages. The second lesson we learn is that the e¤ect of tax evasion on the optimal
marginal income tax rates depends on the convexity of the concealment cost function.
The tax rate decreases as the cost function becomes less convex. Put di¤erently, the less
convex is the concealment cost function (resulting in a higher amount of evasion), the
less labor supplies should be distorted. Loosely speaking, this arises because the easier
it is for agents to misreport their true income to the tax authority, the less e¤ective the
marginal income tax rate becomes as an instrument for changing labor supplies.
As an extension, we allow the concealment costs to also depend on government ex-
penditures to deter evasion. We characterize the optimal amount that the government
should spend on deterrence and discuss how this changes our earlier results under a
passive government. Numerical exercises show that optimally spending resources to
deter evasion strengthens the redistributive potential of taxation by allowing the gov-
ernment to rely further on the general-equilibrium e¤ects on wages for redistribution.
And, to do so, it further raises marginal income tax rates (in absolute value). Moreover,
and in accordance with the theoretical results established in the tax evasion literature,
the evasion-deterrence e¤orts of the government are primarily targeted towards agents
reporting a low level of income.
Interestingly, the characterization of the optimal deterrence cost also highlights the
role that endogeneity of wages play in determining this cost. Specically, wage endo-
geneity generates an additional source of gain from marginally raising the amount of
resources spent on deterrence. However, whether this implies that wage endogeneity
strengthens the importance of spending resources to deter evasion will ultimately de-
pend on the extent to which redistribution is made easier for the government when it
can operate both on an ex-ante (wage channel) and on an ex-post basis (tax-transfer
channel).4
4To avoid misunderstanding, note that this is a di¤erent question from the preceding one. The former
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2 The setting
Consider an economy consisting of two types of agents, low-skilled (denoted by super-
script `) and high-skilled workers (denoted by superscript h). The number of workers
of type j, with j = `; h, is denoted by N j . All workers have identical quasi-linear
preferences dened over consumption c and labor supply L. This is represented by
U = c  v (L) where v (L) is strictly increasing and convex.5
The single consumption good c is produced through a linear homogeneous production
function using labor hours supplied by each of the two types of agents
Q = P

N `L`; NhLh

:
Labor markets are assumed competitive so that the equilibrium wage rate for an agent
of skill-type j, wj , is equal to the value of his marginal product
w` =
@P
 
N `L`; NhLh

@N `L`
 P`;
wh =
@P
 
N `L`; NhLh

@NhLh
 Ph:
Wage rates are thus determined endogenously (as long as the skill types are not perfect
substitutes). As usual, the linear homogeneity of P () allows a simpler characterization.
Dene
n  N
hLh
N `L`
: (1)
concerns the e¤ect of deterrence expenditures on the optimal marginal income tax rates (assuming wages
are determined endogenously and we have tax evasion). The latter asks whether wage endogeneity (in
comparison to xed wages) calls for higher deterrence costs.
5Quasi-linearity is often invoked in the optimal income tax literature; see, e.g., Diamond (1998) or
Salanié (2011). The ensuing implications of no income e¤ects on labor supply and a constant marginal
utility of income make the optimal tax formulas less heavy" allowing one to gain a sharper insight
into the elements that determine the optimal marginal income tax rates. We have nevertheless worked
out the formulas for non-quasi-linear preferences which give us essentially the same picture, albeit with
some nuances, in Gahvari and Micheletto (2017).
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Then rewrite the production function as
Q = N `L`P

1;
NhLh
N `L`

 N `L`p (n) ; (2)
and the equilibrium wage rates as6
w` = p (n)  np0 (n) ; (3)
wh = p0 (n) : (4)
3 The optimal tax problem
3.1 Design
The government intends to design a Pareto-e¢ cient tax policy that allows it to achieve
its revenue raising and redistributive goals. The informational structure of the problem
includes the standard Mirrleesian assumption that the government knows only the dis-
tribution of types in the population and not who is who. This rules out the possibility
of using rst-best type-specic lump-sum taxes/subsidies. However, in contrast to what
is commonly assumed in optimal taxation models, we shall assume that earned incomes
are not publicly observable either. This opens up the possibility of tax evasion.
To model tax evasion, we follow the riskless approach introduced by Usher (1986);
specically, once agents have incurred a cost that is increasing in the amount they
misreport, they face no risk of detection. This simple structure allows the government
to achieve its objectives through a general income tax function T () levied on reported
incomes, M . To see this, recall that in a two-group model without evasion one needs
only to determine the two groupsallocations which can be done by a direct mechanism
6We have,
w` =
@Q
@ (N `L`)
= p (n) +

N `L`

p0 (n)
@n
@ (N `L`)
= p (n) 

NhLh
N `L`

p0 (n) ;
wh =
@Q
@ (NhLh)
=

N `L`

p0 (n)
@n
@ (NhLh)
=

N `L`
N `L`

p0 (n) :
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consisting of two bundles each specifying a particular amount of income (earned equal
to reported), and consumption. The same procedure works in our model if the two
bundles, the one intended for the low-skilled agents and the other for the high-skilled
ones, are specied in terms of reported incomes M and tax payments T (equivalently,
incomes taxpayers may keep: B = M   T ). The reason is that, as we show below, an
(M;B)-bundle corresponds to a (c; L)-bundle; notwithstanding the fact that reported
incomes will likely di¤er from actual incomes.
Consider the optimization problem of an agent who is to choose between bundles
(M `; B`) and (Mh; Bh). Regardless of which bundle he chooses, he would want to
maximize his utility U = c   v (L). Denote the amount he evades, or more precisely
misreports, by a.7 Evasion is costly. A taxpayer who evades a incurs f (a) in costs
where f () is assumed to be non-negative, increasing in a, strictly convex, and that
f (0) = f 0 (0) = 0. Thus the consumption level of a taxpayer who selects (M;B), and
subsequently evades a, is equal to
c = a+B   f (a) ;
where we have dropped the superscripts for ease in notation. Now, with the taxpayers
true earnings being equal to wL, the amount he evades must be equal to a = wL M .
Substituting this in the above equation for c and the resulting expression in U = c v (L)
yields
U = wL M +B   f (wL M)  v (L) . (5)
The taxpayers optimization problem is thus choosing L to maximize (5). This results
7With wage endogeneity, high-skilled agents may end up receiving a subsidy on their marginal income.
This will indeed occur in a two-group model when there are no incentives reasons to tax high-skilled
types at the margin. These agents then have an incentive to over-report rather than under-report their
income. Either way though, the modeling is identical. The only di¤erence is that while with under-
reporting and tax evasion a > 0, over-reporting implies a < 0. Under this latter case, the agents still
need to incur a concealment cost to get away with this cheating. The concealment cost will then be
assumed to be a function of the absolute value of a with the same properties. In principle, then, the
problem is better referred to as income misreporting rather than tax evasion. We shall use the two
terms interchangeably.
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in the rst-order condition
v0 (L) = w

1  f 0 (wL M) ; (6)
which determines L and subsequently c.
Having shown that a taxpayers choice of (M;B) determines his consumption bundle
(c; L), we now discuss how the mechanism designer determines (M `; B`) and (Mh; Bh).
There are two types of constraints that must be considered in this problem. One is
that the bundles must satisfy the economys resource constraint. Secondly, with the
taxpayers being ultimately free to determine their allocations when given a tax function,
the bundles must be incentive compatible (requiring each ability type to prefer the
(M;B)-bundle intended for him to that intended for the other type). However, to
reduce the number of the incentive compatible constraints that must be imposed, assume
that in equilibrium wh  w` so that the redistribution is from high- to low-skilled
workers.8 This allows one to ignore the self-selection constraint corresponding to low-
skilled mimickinghigh-skilled workers (whom, following the literature, we shall refer
to as mimickers).
Let V (M;B;w) denote the maximum value function of problem (5). A Pareto-
e¢ cient tax structure is characterized as the solution to the following problem:
max
Mh;Bh;M`;B`
V

Mh; Bh;wh

subject to,
V

M `; B`;w`

 U `;
V

Mh; Bh;wh

 V

M `; B`;wh

;
P

N `
M ` + a`
w`
; Nh
Mh + ah
wh



B` + a`

N ` +

Bh + ah

Nh;
8Gaube (2005) has demonstrated that wage endogeneity may lead to second-best solutions other than
the traditional redistributive and regressive cases. We nevertheless concentrate on the wh  w`
alone in light of the papers goals.
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where (M j + aj)=wj = Lj . The rst constraint prescribes a minimum utility for the
low-skilled agents; the second constraint is the binding self-selection constraint requiring
high-skilled agents not to behave as mimickers, and the last constraint is the resource
constraint of the economy.
Introduce the notation
g (n)  p (n)  np0 (n) ; (7)
and treat w` as an articial control variable for the government. This allows one to
formulate the Lagrangian of the governments problem above as
L = V

Mh; Bh; wh

+ V

M `; B`; w`

(8)
+

P

N `
M ` + a`
w`
; Nh
Mh + ah
wh

 

B` + a`

N `  

Bh + ah

Nh

+
h
V

Mh; Bh; wh

  V

M `; B`; wh
i
+
h
w`   g (n)
i
;
where , , , and  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraint requir-
ing a given level of utility for the low-skilled, the economys resource balance constraint,
the self-selection constraint, and the constraint capturing the equilibrium value of the
wage rate of low-skilled agents. The optimal values of Mh; Bh;M `; B` are given by the
rst-order conditions to this problem presented in the Appendix [equations (A30)(A31)
and (A36)(A37)].
3.2 Properties
We can now specify the properties of the optimal tax schedule T (M) that implements
(M j ; Bj), and thus (cj ; Lj), j = `; h. Faced with the tax schedule T (M), or alternatively
B (M)  M   T (M), an agent with the utility function V (M;B;w) chooses M to
maximize V (M;B (M) ;w). Assuming T (M) and thus B (M) is di¤erentiable, the
rst-order condition for this problem is,
dV
dM
=
@V
@M
+
@V
@B
dB
dM
= 0 =) dB
dM
=  @V=@M
@V=@B
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We also have, from di¤erentiating B (M)  M   T (M), that dB=dM = 1   T 0 (M).
Hence one can rewrite the above condition as 1   T 0 (M) =   (@V=@M) = (@V=@B).
This property allows us to implicitly dene the marginal income tax faced by an agent,
T 0 (M), as
T 0 (M) = 1 +
@V=@M
@V=@B
 1 MRSMB; (9)
where MRSMB denotes the marginal rate of substitution between M and B.9 Now
recall that V (M;B;w) represents the maximum value function of problem (5). Invok-
ing the envelope theorem, @V=@M =   [1  f 0 (wL M)] and @V=@B = 1. Thus, in
equilibrium, we will have,10
T 0 (M) = f 0 (wL M) : (10)
In order to establish the properties of T 0 (M), we begin by presenting two results.
Lemma 1 proves that at any point in the (M;B)-space, the indi¤erence curves of low-
skilled agents are steeper than those of the high-skilled agents. Lemma 2 proves that ,
the multiplier associated with the last constraint in the governments problem summa-
rized by the Lagrangian (8), is negative.
Lemma 1 Assume that the Mirrleesian agent-monotonicity condition in income and
consumption (wL; c)-space is satised. Then:
(i) The same property holds in the (M;B)-space so that
(ii) The high-skilled worker pretending to be low-skilled will evade more than the
low-skilled worker. That is, ah` > a`.
Proof. See the Appendix.
9As is well known (see, e.g. Stiglitz, 1982, p. 217, and Stiglitz, 1987, p. 1003), with two groups of
individuals, the implementing tax function T (M) will not in general be di¤erentiable at one point. In
our setting, the problem occurs atM `. Nevertheless, there always exists an implementing tax structure
whose left-hand derivative at M ` will be given by (9).
10The rst-order conditions hinge on the assumptions about the evasion cost function f (); in par-
ticular f (0) = f 0 (0) = 0. Observe also that the equilibrium condition (10) does not imply that tax
evasion a¤ects the marginal income tax rate only through the shape of f (). Evasion also a¤ects wL;
thus the argument of f 0 () and with it T 0 (M) :
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Lemma 2 The multiplier , as specied in the Lagrangian (8), is negative.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We are now in a position to give a characterization for the optimal marginal income
tax rates of the skilled and unskilled workers. These characterizations are the basis for
the main results of the paper.
Proposition 1 Consider a two-skill-type Mirrleesian general income tax problem wherein
wages wj, j = h; `, are determined endogenously. Preferences are quasi-linear in con-
sumption c with the labor supply L as the other argument. Let M denote reported
income, M   B income tax paid, MRSMB the marginal rate of substitution between
M and B, N jis the number of j-type workers with n  NhLh=N `L`, g (n) by (7) with
g0 () > 0 , and ; ;  the Lagrange multipliers associated with the economys resource
balance constraint, the self-selection constraint, and the constraint capturing the equi-
librium value of the wage rate of low-skilled agents.
If taxpayers can misreport their earning wL and avoid detection by incurring a cost
f (a) which is increasing in a and convex, the optimal marginal income tax rates faced
by the high- and the low-skilled agents are given by:
T 0

Mh

= h
ng0
whNhLh
(11)
T 0

M `

=

N `
h
MRS`MB  MRSh`MB
i
 ` ng
0
w`N `L`
; (12)
where,
0 < j 
 
wj
2
f 00
 
aj

v00 (Lj) + (wj)2 f 00 (aj)
 1: (13)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The rst point to note about Proposition 1 is that the optimal marginal income
tax rate on the low-skilled type consists of two expressions. The rst expression on the
right-hand side of (12) is standard and reects the incentive term that characterizes the
optimal marginal tax rate faced by low-skilled agents in a setting where wages are xed.
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Given the agent-monotonicity condition in the (M;B)-space, MRS`MB  MRSh`MB > 0
so that this term continues to be positive with tax evasion. That there is no such term
in (11) is of course due to the so-called no-distortion-at-the-topresult.
Secondly, the second expression on the right-hand side of (12), as well as the sole
expression on the right-hand side of (11), arises because of the endogeneity of wage
rates. With g0 = p0   p0   np00 =  np00 > 0, and  < 0, this calls for an additional
tax on the marginal income of the low-skilled and a subsidy on the marginal income of
high-skilled both of which result in increasing the relative wage of the low-skilled to
the high-skilled. This result is in keeping with previous ndings in the literature in the
absence of tax evasion (see, e.g., Stiglitz 1982, 1987).
3.3 Evasion versus no evasion
The two points we made above explain the components of the optimal marginal income
tax rates in our model. However to understand the import of tax evasion per se, in a set-
ting where wage rates are endogenously determined, one must compare these expression
with the corresponding optimal marginal income tax rates in the absence of evasion.
Thus assume earnings are publicly observable and cannot be misreported. Then aj = 0,
M j = wjLj , and Bj = cj . We show in the Appendix that the optimal marginal income
tax rates in the absence of tax evasion are characterized by
T 0

Mh

=
ng0
whNhLh
(14)
T 0

M `

=

N `
h
MRS`MB  MRSh`MB
i
  ng
0
w`N `L`
: (15)
Comparing (14)(15) with (11)(12) reveals, rstly, that tax evasion leaves the incentive
terms in the optimal marginal income tax rate intact but mitigates the impact coming
from the channel due to general-equilibrium e¤ect on the relative wage rates. This
follows because of these latter terms are multiplied by a factor j , as dened in (13),
with the property 0 < j  1 . Consequently, tax evasion points to the desirability of a
lowertax rate on the low-skilled and a lowersubsidy rate on the high-skilled (smaller
11
positive distortion on the labor supply of high-skilled and smaller negative distortion
on the labor supply of low-skilled).11
We must emphasize here that lower and higher in this discussion refers only
to what the tax rulessuggest and not the nal equilibrium levelsof the tax. The
common variables appearing in the tax formulas with and without tax evasion assume
di¤erent values in the two cases and do not allow a comparison between tax levels. Our
terminology is based on the distinction Atkinson and Stern (1974) make between the
rule for and the level of optimal provision of public goods in a rst-best versus a
second-best world.
The second observation about the impact of tax evasion can be gleaned from the
expression for j in (13). It tells us that the e¤ect of tax evasion on the optimal
marginal income tax rates depends on the convexity of the concealment cost function.
The reduction becomes greater (i.e. the tax rate decreases) as f (a) becomes less convex
(f 00 (a) becomes smaller). In words, the less convex is the concealment cost function
(resulting in a higher amount of evasion), the less one should distort labor supplies.12
Loosely speaking, this arises because the easier it is for agents to misreport their true
income to the tax authority, the less e¤ective the marginal income tax rate becomes as
an instrument to a¤ect labor supplies.
4 Deterrence
The riskless approach to tax evasion assumes that taxpayers can get away with cheating
by spending a given amount of resources (for book-keeping, lawyers, etc.). This makes
the tax authority a passive agent. A more realistic approach assigns a role to the tax
11As pointed out earlier, in a two-group model, the high-skilled agents face a negative marginal income
tax rate. Tax evasion for them takes the form of over-stating their true income to the tax authority to
get a better tax treatment.
12 In deriving our results, we rely on condition (10), which in turn hinges on the assumed properties
of the f -function, and in particular the fact that it is strictly convex, and that f (0) = f 0 (0) = 0.
These assumptions are standard in the literature (see references in footnote 2) that adopts the riskless
approach to modeling tax evasion. Their inclusion though implies that one cannot apply equations
(11)(12) to the case when f 00 = 0.
12
authority and recognizes its power to make cheating more di¢ cult for taxpayers. One
way to model this, while retaining the riskless property of our approach, is to assume
the tax authority can make taxpayerscheating more costly by spending resources of its
own to deter tax evasion. Of course, given the assumption that taxpayers are always
able to conceal their cheating, the tax authoritys attempt at enforcement can only be
useful if it weakens the self-selection constraint V
 
Mh; Bh;wh
  V  M `; B`;wh that
would otherwise be binding. If not, deterrence attempts will be pure waste (to the
government as well as the economy).
Specically, assume that the concealment cost of evasion is given by the non-negative
function f (a;R) where R denotes the (per capita) amount of resources the tax authority
spends to prevent evasion. Assume also that f (0; R) = fa (0; R) = 0, f (a;R) is increas-
ing in R and a (in absolute value), faR (a;R) > 0 (a in absolute value), fRR (a;R) > 0,
and faa (a;R) > 0 (where one subscript on f denotes a rst partial derivative and two
subscripts a second partial derivative).13
With R as an additional policy tool, the Lagrangian of the governments problem
becomes:
L = V

Mh; Bh; R;wh

+ V

M `; B`; R;w`

+

P

N `
M ` + a`
w`
; Nh
Mh + ah
wh

 

B` + a`  R

N `  

Bh + ah  R

Nh

+
h
V

Mh; Bh; R;wh

  V

M `; B`; R;wh
i
+
h
w`   g (n)
i
:
It is clear from this representation that the characterization of the optimal marginal
income tax rates provided by (11)(12) remains valid even after expanding the armory
of governments policy tools to include R as an additional instrument. The obvious
13The assumption faR > 0 ensures that R will have an interior solution. Intuitively, the assumption
means that increasing the expenditure on deterrence increases the individuals marginal cost of evasion.
13
reason for this result is that the optimal marginal income tax rates are obtained by
properly combining the rst-order condition to the governments problem with respect
toMh, Bh,M `, and B`; for a given value for R, these rst-order conditions take exactly
the same form as in the problem considered in the previous section.14
This leaves us with the task of characterizing the optimal policy with respect to the
choice of R. The rst-order condition of the governments problem with respect to this
policy variable is given by:
@L
@R
= (1 + )
@V h
@R
+ 
@V `
@R
  @V
h`
@R
+

P`
N `
w`
@a`
@R
+ Ph
Nh
wh
@ah
@R
 N `

@a`
@R
+ 1

 Nh

@ah
@R
+ 1

  g0 @n
@R
 0;
with the associated Kuhn-Tucker condition R@L=@R = 0 to allow for the possibility
that the optimal value for R is zero. Setting P` = w` and Ph = wh, this is simplied to
@L
@R
= (1 + )
@V h
@R
+ 
@V `
@R
  @V
h`
@R
 

N ` +Nh

   g0 @n
@R
 0: (16)
Focusing on an interior solution for R (i.e. R > 0), problem (16) provides us with a
characterization for the optimal value for R.
Proposition 2 Assume Problem (16) has an interior solution (i.e. R > 0) and let
	j  v00  Lj+  wj2 faa  aj ; R ; j = h; `:
14Of course, this does not mean that the numerical value of the marginal income tax rates characterized
by (11)(12) will be identical in the two cases (unless the optimal policy for the government is to set
R = 0). Moreover, with the f -function now depending both on a and R, one needs to replace f 00
 
ah

in (11) and f 00
 
a`

in (12) with faa
 
ah; R

and faa
 
a`; R

, and to properly redene j as
j 
 
wj
2
faa(a
j ; R)
v00 (Lj) + (wj)2 faa(aj ; R)
; j = h; `:
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The optimal amount of resources spent to deter evasion is implicitly characterized by

h
fR

ah`; R

  fR

a`; R
i
| {z }
 >0
+
"
whfaR
 
ah; R

Lh	h
  w
`faR
 
a`; R

L`	`
#
ng0| {z }

>0
=

h
N `

1 + fR

a`; R

+Nh

1 + fR

ah; R
i
| {z }
>0
: (17)
Proof. See the Appendix (for both the expression and the signs).
To interpret condition (17) it is useful to consider the e¤ects of a policy reform that
marginally raises R while at the same time adjusting B` and Bh in such a way as to
leave the utility of all non-mimicking agents una¤ected. This requires accompanying
the marginal increase in R with an upward adjustment in B` and Bh given by dB` =
fR
 
a`; R

and dBh = fR
 
ah; R

. The right-hand side of condition (17) represents the
overall revenue cost of this reform.
The left hand side of (17) captures the gains of the proposed reform. They come
from two sources. First, there is a gain associated with relaxing the binding self-selection
constraint. This is given by the rst term on the left-hand side of condition (17), the
term labeled  . We have already shown in the Appendix, when the concealment cost
is independent of R, that ah` > a` > 0. However, it is clear from the proof that it also
works when f () depends on R. This implies that fR
 
ah`; R

> fR
 
a`; R

; hence, while
the reform leaves the utility of the low-skilled agents intact, it lowers the utility of a
high-skilled mimicker.
Second, there is a gain, working via general-equilibrium e¤ects, emanating from a
reduction in the wage gap between high- and low-skilled workers. This comes about
because, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix, @n=@R > 0 so that
the proposed reform induces an increase in n, i.e. in the ratio of the labor supply of
high-skilled workers to that of low-skilled workers. This increases the relative wage of
low-skilled to high-skilled workers and represents a gain through its impact on the -
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constraint.15 The second term on the left-hand side of condition (17), the term labeled

, captures this e¤ect.16
Notice that in a setting with exogenous wages the counterpart of (17) would be the
following simplied condition:

h
fR

ah`; R

  fR

a`; R
i
= 
h
N `

1 + fR

a`; R

+Nh

1 + fR

ah; R
i
;
(18)
i.e. the term labeled 
 in (17), representing one of the two sources of gains from
raising R, would vanish. That 
 > 0 suggests that spending resources to deter tax
evasion might be relatively more valuable in a setting with endogenous wages than in
a setting where wages are exogenous. Intuitive as this may seem, such a rule-type
inference is not quite warranted. The gain to combating tax evasion comes not just
from 
 but   as well. Now when di¤erent types of labor are imperfect substitutes,
the fact that redistribution can operate both on an ex-ante (wage channel) and on an
ex-post basis (tax-transfer channel) tends to weaken the tightness of the self-selection
constraint and to lower the equilibrium value of the Lagrange multiplier  in (18) as
compared to (17).
4.1 Targeted deterrence
The way we have introduced the policy variable R in above suggests that the evasion-
deterrence e¤orts of the government are not targeted towards specic levels of reported
income. Suppose instead that the resources devoted to ght evasion can be made
income-dependent so that an agent reporting an income M j will face a concealment
cost f
 
a;Rj

, where Rj denotes the (per capita) resources devoted to deter evasion by
agents reporting an income M j . The Lagrangian of the governments problem would
15What is behind this change in relative wages is that, with two factors of production, they are
necessarily Edgeworth complements.
16The gain represented by the term 
 in (17) is, ultimately, a gain due to mimicking-deterring e¤ects.
This is apparent once one notices that, as implied by (A29), the value of the shadow price  is related
to the value of the Lagrange multiplier , and that  = 0 when  = 0.
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become:
L = V

Mh; Bh; Rh; wh

+ V

M `; B`; R`; w`

+

P

N `
M ` + a`
w`
; Nh
Mh + ah
wh

 

B` + a`  R`

N `  

Bh + ah  Rh

Nh

+
h
V

Mh; Bh; Rh; wh

  V

M `; B`; R`; wh
i
+
h
w`   g (n)
i
:
Focusing on the case of an interior solution for both R` and Rh, it is straightforward
to show that their optimal values would be implicitly characterized by the two following
conditions, which respectively refer to R` and Rh:

h
fR

ah`; R`

  fR

a`; R`
i
| {z }
>0
  w
`
L`
faR
 
a`; R`

	`
ng0| {z }
<0
= N `
h
1 + fR

a`; R`
i
| {z }
>0
;(19)
wh
Lh
faR
 
ah; Rh

	h
ng0| {z }
>0
= Nh
h
1 + fR

ah; Rh
i
| {z }
>0
: (20)
In both equations (19) and (20), the left-hand side provides a measure of the social
gains arising from a marginal increase in the value of the relevant policy variable, and
the right hand side provides a measure of the associated social cost. Eq. (19) highlights
that the evasion-deterrence e¤orts targeted at the agents reporting M ` generate two
sources of gains, a direct mimicking-deterring e¤ect due to the fact that ah` > a`, and
an indirect mimicking-deterring e¤ect that operates through a compression of the wage
distribution. On the other hand, from eq. (20) one can see that only the latter source
of gains can be reaped by the evasion-deterrence e¤orts targeted at agents reporting
Mh. At least in terms of policy rules, this observation leads support to the idea that
it is more e¤ective to target the evasion-deterrence e¤orts towards low-income earners.
At the same time, however, the fact that wages are endogenously determined implies
that one should not refrain from allocate resources to deter evasion by agents reporting
a high level of income.
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5 Two extensions
5.1 Commodity taxes
If labor income could be costlessly observed by the government, there would clearly be
no role for supplementing a nonlinear income tax with a commodity tax in our setting.
With one single consumption good in our model, the e¤ect of any commodity tax could
simply be replicated by a proper adjustment of the nonlinear labor income tax. However,
when agents can misreport income for tax purposes, commodity taxation will be a non-
redundant policy instrument if aggregate sales of commodities are publicly observable
and are taxed (at a uniform rate to all consumers). These taxes will not be subject to
evasion. Under this circumstance, one can show that all the expressions for the optimal
marginal income tax rates would have to be amended to include an additional negative
term that depends on the rate at which the commodity tax is levied. Moreover, although
the additional negative term takes a di¤erent value for each skill type in the population
because of their di¤erent consumption levels, for each skill type its absolute value is
decreasing in the curvature of the f -function.17
5.2 Many-skill-types
We now show that the main message of our paper, namely, the possibility that tax eva-
sion mitigates the kind of tax-induced general equilibrium e¤ects originally emphasized
by Stiglitz (1982, 1987), does not rely on a two-group specication. Consider a setting
where the number of skill types is larger than two, say, K. Output is then produced
through a generalized version of the constant-returns-to-scale production function (2)
according to,
Q = P
 
N0L0; N1L1; :::; NKLK

= N0L0p

N1L1
N0L0
;
N2L2
N0L0
; :::;
NKLK
N0L0

;
17The detailed analytical results are available upon request.
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where the set of skill types is given by f0; :::;Kg with a higher index corresponding to
a higher skill type. Let
nj  N
jLj
N0L0
, j = 1; 2; : : : ;K:
The labor markets being competitive, wage rates are given by,
w0 = p+N0L0
KX
i=1
@p
@nj
@nj
@ (N0L0)
= p
 
n1; n2; :::; nK
  KX
i=1
njp0j
 
n1; n2; :::; nK

;
w1 = N0L0
@p
@n1
@n1
@ (N1L1)
= p01
 
n1; n2; :::; nK

;
w2 = N0L0
@p
@n2
@n2
@ (N2L2)
= p02
 
n1; n2; :::; nK

;
...
wK = N0L0
@p
@nK
@nK
@ (NKLK)
= p0K
 
n1; n2; :::; nK

:
Next dene,
g0
 
n1; n2; :::; nK
  p  n1; n2; :::; nK  KX
i=1
njp0j
 
n1; n2; :::; nK

;
gi
 
n1; n2; :::; nK
  p0i  n1; n2; :::; nK ; i = 1; 2; : : : ;K   1:
The constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations can then be characterized by the rst-order
conditions of a government problem summarized by the Lagrangian:
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L =
KX
i=0
iV
 
M i; Bi; wi

+
(
P

N0
M0 + a0
w0
; N1
M1 + a1
w1
; :::; NK
MK + aK
wK

 
KX
i=0
 
B0 + a0

N0
)
+
KX
i=1
i;i 1

V
 
M i; Bi; wi
  V  M i 1; Bi 1; wi
+
K 1X
i=0
i

wi   gi
 
n1; n2; :::; nK

;
where in writing the set of self-selection constraints we have assumed that the binding
ones are those linking downward pair of adjacent types.18 Following the same approach
we used to derive (11)-(12), and denoting V
 
M i; Bi; wi

and V
 
M i 1; Bi 1; wi

by V i
and V i;i 1, one would end up with the following expressions for T 0
 
MK

, T 0
 
M0

, and
T 0
 
M j

for j 2 f1; 2; :::;K   1g:19
T 0
 
M0

=
1;0
N0

MRS0MB  MRS1;0MB

  
0
w0N0L0
K 1X
i=0
i
24 KX
j=1
@gi
 
n1; n2; :::; nK

@nj
nj
35 ; (21)
T 0
 
M j

=
j+1;j
N j

MRSjMB  MRSj+1;jMB

+
j
wjN jLj
"
K 1X
i=0
i
@gi
 
n1; n2; :::; nK

@nj
nj
#
; j = 1; 2; :::;K   1; (22)
T 0
 
MK

=
K
wKNKLK
"
K 1X
i=0
i
@gi
 
n1; n2; :::; nK

@nK
nK
#
: (23)
One can also easily show that when tax evasion is not possible the optimal mar-
ginal income tax rates are again characterized by (21)(23) except that j = 1 for all
18See Guesnerie and Seade (1982) for a justication of this assumption.
19The detailed derivations are available upon request.
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j = 0; 1; : : : ;K. And, with j being dened as previously by (13), the optimal mar-
ginal income tax rates tend to decrease more and more as f (a) becomes less and less
convex (f 00 (a) becomes smaller). In words, the extent to which the government uses the
marginal income tax rates as an instrument to a¤ect redistribution via general equilib-
rium e¤ects depends on the curvature of the evasion cost function: a lower curvature
weakens the incentives for the government to manipulate the marginal income tax rates
to induce general equilibrium e¤ects on wages. One should nevertheless point out here
that with more than two factors of production the sign of expressions like @gi=@nj will
depend on the complementarity/substitutability relationship between factors of produc-
tion. This also prevents one to nd a determinate sign for all is. Nevertheless the fact
that j < 1, our conclusions about the e¤ect of tax evasion remain valid.
Finally, observe that in the case when the government can a¤ect the concealment
costs, one can also nd a generalized expression corresponding to (17). This is given by,
KX
i=1
i;i 1

fR
 
ai;i 1; R
  fR  ai 1; R+ K 1X
i=0
i
24 KX
j=1
@gi
@nj
nj
 
wjfaR
 
aj ; R

	jLj
  w
0faR
 
a0; R

	0L0
!35
= 
KX
i=0
N i
 
1 + fR
 
ai; R

:
and has the same interpretation as previously.
6 Numerical illustrations
This section illustrates our results through a number of numerical examples based on
four types. There are low-skilled and high-skilled agents who are imperfect substitutes
with varying wages. At the same time, within each skill type, there are two di¤erent
types of workers who are perfect substitutes but have di¤erent productivities: one type
produces more than the other for one hour of labor but at a xed rate. Specically,
assume that the production function is of the CES type and given by,
Q =

1
10

N `1L`1 + 1:1N `2L`2
 1

+
9
10

Nh1Lh1 + 1:4Nh2Lh2
 1

 
 1
; (24)
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where  denotes the elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skilled workers, the
superscripts `1 and `2 denote the less and the more productive workers among the low-
skilled agents, and the superscripts h1 and h2 denote the less and the more productive
workers among the high-skilled agents.20 We assume that there is an equal proportion
of agents of each skill type and set N `1 = N `2 = Nh1 = Nh2 = 1.
All agents have identical preferences represented by:
U = ln c  L
2
2
: (25)
Regarding the governments objective function we will consider both the case of a purely
utilitarian objective and the case of a maxi-min social welfare function. Finally, assume
that the evasion function is given by:
f (a;R) = a2 + 25a2R; (26)
where  is a parameter a¤ecting the curvature of f (a;R), andR is per capita government
expenditures to ght evasion (set equal to such expenditures/4 in our computations).
6.1 Utilitarian objective
We begin by solving for the case of a purely utilitarian social welfare function, i.e. the
case when the government maximizes W = j=`;hi=1;2N jiU ji. We set  = 1=2 in
(24) and initially assume that R is not a policy instrument (i.e. we set R = 0). Table
1 reports, for the same model specication, the optimal marginal income tax rates,
MITR, the resulting wages, and the associated utility levels when the possibility of tax
evasion does not exist (the rst three columns) and when it does (the last three columns
with  = 1 in (26)).
20As usual,  = 0 corresponds to the Leontief case and perfect substitutability is attained when 
approaches 1.
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Comparing the results, one observes that the optimal marginal tax rates are more
compressed when agents have the possibility to evade. Specically, tax evasion lowers
the marginal income tax rates for all types (in absolute value). Additionally, tax evasion
leads to lower wage rates and lower utility levels for low-skilled workers (`1- and `2
types), and higher wage rates and higher utility levels for high-skilled workers (h1- and
h2 types). This reverse redistribution lowers the utilitarian social welfare. The outcome
corroborates the rst point we made in subsection 3.3 regarding the e¤ects of tax evasion
in our model. The possibility of tax evasion weakens the incentive for the government
to manipulate the marginal tax rates for the purpose of exploiting general equilibrium
e¤ects on wages.
Second, we examine the e¤ects of the curvature of concealment cost on the optimal
marginal income tax rates (the second point stated in subsection 3.3). To do so, we
lower  from 1 to  = 0:1 making the concealment cost function less convex. The
results for this case are reported in the rst three columns of Table 2. Comparing these
results with those in the last three columns of Table 1, indicates that the lowering of
the curvature of the concealment cost function leads to drastic reductions in the values
of the marginal income tax rates faced by `1-, `2, and h1-types. This is also in line
with our theoretical result that the less convex is the f -function the weaker will be the
incentive for the government to manipulate the marginal tax rates. Additionally, a less
convex concealment cost function results in lower wages and utility levels for the low-
skilled workers (`1- and `2 types) and higher wages and utility levels for the high-skilled
workers (h1- and h2 types). The utilitarian social welfare too is further reduced.
Third, we consider how government expenditure to deter tax evasion, R, a¤ects our
results. The only thing we could say about this theoretically was that for R to be
positive, it must be possible to increase redistribution from the high-skilled towards the
low-skilled group of workers. The gures in the last three columns of Table 2 report
our ndings when R is a policy instrument. These gures show that R has indeed an
interior solution. Moreover, comparisons with the corresponding gures in the rst three
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columns show that spending resources to deter tax evasion enables the government to
raise social welfare by strengthening redistribution from the high-skilled towards the
low-skilled group of workers (in line with the observation we made in Section 4). By
making it more costly for the agents to evade, the government nds it more e¤ective to
raise the marginal income tax rates (in absolute value). Which allows it to exploit, to
a larger extent, the tax-induced general-equilibrium e¤ects on wages.
Finally, to illustrate how results are a¤ected when R is allowed to be income-
dependent, we use the same identical evasion cost function (26) while replacing per
capita deterrence cost R by R
 
M j

, the per capita value for the group reporting in-
come M j . The results are reported in Table 3. They are to be contrasted with the
corresponding results in Table 2 in the case where the governments attempts to deter
evasion in a non-targeted way.
The rst thing to note is the fact that the utilitarian social welfare has now increased
from -1.101 to -1.079. This accords with ones expectation in that allowing R
 
M j

to
vary across income types can never decrease social welfare. The relevant point to
highlight, however, is the nding that the evasion-deterrence e¤orts of the government
are primarily targeted towards agents reporting a low level of income. Moreover, no
resources are to be spent in this case on thwarting the evasion possibilities of agents
reporting the highest level of income (i.e. we obtain a corner solution for R
 
Mh2

).
This is in accordance with the theoretical results established in the literature [see, e.g.,
Cremer and Gahvari (1996)].
6.2 Maxi-min objective
To further illustrate our ndings we redo our computations for a maxi-min social welfare
function, i.e. the case when the government maximizes W = U `1. We again set  = 1=2
and start rst with the case when R is not a policy instrument (R = 0). The resulting
optimal marginal income tax rates, MITR, wages, and the associated utility levels are
reported in Table 3 (with the rst three columns corresponding to the no tax evasion
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case and the last three columns to when there is evasion with  = 1). The results show
an even higher compression of marginal income tax rates as compared to the utilitarian
case thus corroborating our theoretical comparisons in subsection 3.3. The absolute
value of the marginal income tax rates decrease drastically for all types (particularly
the low-skilled types). Additionally, the possibility of tax evasion lowers the wages and
the utility levels of `1- and `2-types while increasing the wages and utility levels of
the h1- and h2-types. With the utility level of the low-skilled workers decreasing, the
possibility of tax evasion lowers social welfare.
Second, to re-examine the e¤ects of the curvature of concealment cost, we again
make the function less convex by lowering  from 1 to  = 0:1 and reporting the results
in the rst three columns of Table 4. Comparing these results with those in the last
three columns of Table 3 indicates that lowering the curvature lowers the marginal
income tax rates quite substantially for all type (in absolute values). Once again this
corroborates the second point we made in subsection 3.3. In particular, the less convex
is the f -function and the weaker is the incentive for the government to manipulate the
marginal tax rates for the purpose of exploiting general equilibrium e¤ects on wages.
Additionally, the wages and utility levels of `1- and `2- types diminish but the wages
and the utility levels of the h1- and h2-types improve. Social welfare decreases.
Third, we again consider the e¤ects of government attempting to deter tax evasion.
The gures in the last three columns of Table 4 report our ndings when R is a policy
instrument. Comparisons with the corresponding gures in the rst three columns
show that spending resources to ght tax evasion enables the government to raise social
welfare by strengthening redistribution towards the low-skilled group of workers. By
making it more costly for the agents to evade, the government nds it more e¤ective to
raise the marginal income tax rates (in absolute value). This allows it to exploit, to a
larger extent, the tax-induced general-equilibrium e¤ects on wages and increase social
welfare.
Finally, we again allow for R to be income-dependent and use the same identical
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evasion cost function (26) to determine how the tax authority will spend its resources.
The results are reported in Table 6. They are to be contrasted with the corresponding
results in Table 5 in the case where the governments attempts to deter evasion in a
non-targeted way.
The maxi-min social welfare now increases from -1.284 to -1.252 as a result of al-
lowing R
 
M j

to vary across income types. Again note that the evasion-deterrence
e¤orts of the government are primarily targeted towards agents reporting a low level
of income. Moreover, no resources are spent in this case too on thwarting the evasion
possibilities of agents reporting the highest level of income.21
7 Conclusion
This paper has studied, within a Mirrleesian optimal tax framework, the interaction
between tax evasion and wage endogeneity (due to the e¤ects of taxation on gross-of-
tax wages). Prior studies on optimal taxation with endogenous wages have neglected
tax evasion; while prior studies of tax evasion have neglected the endogeneity of wages.
We appended a production function, that has skilled and unskilled workers as inputs,
to the two-group model of Stiglitz (1982). Using this setup, and in conjunction with the
riskless approach of Usher (1986) to tax evasion, we have derived a characterization for
the optimal marginal income tax rates on the skilled- and the unskilled workers and for
the optimal amount of resources that the government should spend to deter tax evasion.
The results have then been generalized to a many-skilled group model. Finally, we have
run a few numerical simulations to illustrate the magnitude of the phenomena that we
have studied.
Among the ndings of the paper are: (i) the possibility of tax evasion weakens the
21Running many simulations, we nd that our result on the government targeting lower-income types,
in its attempt to deter evasion, is robust for the maxi-min criterion as well as the utilitarian case.
However, the zero expenditure on the highest income type can change. For example, if the coe¢ cient
of a2R in the evasion cost function changes from 25 to 250, implying that the evasion-deterrence e¤orts
of the government prove to be more e¤ective in raising the private marginal cost of evasion, R
 
M j

in
the maxi-min case will decline from 25.94 to 20.88 to 15.61 and nally to 2.23 as income increases.
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incentives for the government to manipulate the marginal tax rates for the purpose
of exploiting general equilibrium e¤ects on wages; (ii) the e¤ect of tax evasion on the
optimal marginal income tax rates depends on the convexity of the concealment cost
function: the tax rate decreases as the cost function becomes less convex; (iii) optimally
spending resources to deter evasion strengthens the redistributive potential of taxation
via the general-equilibrium e¤ects on wages resulting in higher marginal income tax rates
(in absolute value); and the evasion-deterrence e¤orts of the government are primarily
targeted towards agents reporting a low level of income.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (i). Recall that the agent monotonicity condition in (wL; c)-
space requires
d
dw

@c
@wL

< 0:
But c = a+B f (a) and wL = M +a. Consequently, given any point (M;B), we have
d
dw

@ (a+B   f (a))
@ (M + a)

=
d
dw
 
1  f 0 (a) < 0: (A1)
Recall, from (9)(10), that 1  MRSMB = f 0 (a). It thus follows from inequality (A1)
that
d
dw
MRSMB < 0;
which is the single-crossing property in the (M;B)-space.
Part (ii). The single-crossing property proved in Part (i) implies
MRShMB

M `; B`

< MRS`MB

M `; B`

On the basis of this inequality and the fact that 1  MRSMB = f 0 (a), we have 1  
f 0
 
ah`

< 1   f 0  a` or f 0  ah` > f 0  a`. It then follows from the convexity of f ()
that,
ah` > a`: (A2)
Proof of Lemma 2. We rst derive a number of algebraic expressions that are subse-
quently used in the proof. These expressions also simplify the rst-order conditions of
the governments problem summarized by the Lagrangian (8) and the proof of Proposi-
tion 1.
Step (i): Algebraic derivations to be used in the proofs.
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 The e¤ects of a change in Bj ;M j, and wj on a j-types choice of Lj. Implicitly
di¤erentiating equation (6) partially with respect to Bj ; M j , and wj yields, for
all j = h; `;
@Lj
@Bj
= 0; (A3)
@Lj
@M j
=
wjf 00
v00 + (wj)2 f 00
> 0; (A4)
@Lj
@wj
=
1  f 0   wjLjf 00
v00 + (wj)2 f 00
: (A5)
Observe also that in the case of a mimicker the rst-order condition (6) takes the
form
v0

Ljk

= wj
h
1  f 0

wjLjk  Mk
i
so that its implicit di¤erentiation yields
@Ljk
@wj
=
1  f 0  ajk  wjLjkf 00  ajk
v00 (Ljk) + (wj)2 f 00 (ajk)
: (A6)
 The e¤ects of a change in Bj ;M j, and wj on a j-types choice of aj. Recall
that individualsearnings consist of reported and not-reported incomes. That is,
wjLj = M j + aj . Partially di¤erentiating this relationship with respect to Bj
and M j and substituting from (A3)(A5) for @Lj=@Bj ; @Lj=@M j , and @Lj=@wj
yields,
@aj
@Bj
= 0; (A7)
@aj
@M j
=
 
wj
2
f 00
v00 + (wj)2 f 00
  1 =  v
00
v00 + (wj)2 f 00
< 0: (A8)
@aj
@wj
= Lj + wj
@Lj
@wj
=
v00Lj + wj (1  f 0)
v00 + (wj)2 f 00
(A9)
As to the mimicker, it follows from partial di¤erentiation of wjLjk = ajk + Mk
with respect to wj that
@ajk
@wj
= Ljk + wj
@Ljk
@wj
=
Ljkv00
 
Ljk

+ wj

1  f 0  ajk
v00 (Ljk) + (wj)2 f 00 (ajk)
: (A10)
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 The e¤ects of a change in Bj andM j on n. Partially di¤erentiate n  NhLh=N `L`
with respect to Bh;Mh; B`, and M `. We have,
@n
@Bh
=
Nh
N `L`
@Lh
@Bh
= 0; (A11)
@n
@Mh
=
Nh
N `L`
@Lh
@Mh
=
n
Lh
whf 00
 
ah

v00 (Lh) + (wh)2 f 00 (ah)
; (A12)
@n
@B`
=
NhLh
N `
@
@B`

1
L`

= 0; (A13)
@n
@M `
=
NhLh
N `
@
@M `

1
L`

=
NhLh
N `
"
 1
(L`)
2
#
w`f 00
 
a`

v00 (L`) + (w`)2 f 00 (a`)
;
=
 n
L`

w`f 00
 
a`

v00 (L`) + (w`)2 f 00 (a`)
; (A14)
where we have substituted the expressions for @Lh=@Bh and @Lh=@Mh from (A3)
(A4) and the expressions for @L`=@B` and @L`=@M ` from (A3)(A4).
 The e¤ect of a change in w` on n. Partially di¤erentiate n  NhLh=N `L` with
respect to w` to get,
@n
@w`
=
Nh
N `
@
@w`

Lh
L`

=
Nh
N `
"
L` @L
h
@wh
@wh
@w`
  Lh @L`
@w`
(L`)
2
#
= n

1
Lh
@Lh
@wh
@wh
@w`
  1
L`
@L`
@w`

Substitute the expressions for @Lh=@wh and @L`=@w` from (A5) into above and
simplify:
@n
@w`
= n
"
1
Lh
1  f 0  ah  whLhf 00  ah
v00 (Lh) + (wh)2 f 00 (ah)
@wh
@w`
  1
L`
1  f 0  a`  w`L`f 00  a`
v00 (L`) + (w`)2 f 00 (a`)
#
= n
1
whLh
wh

1  f 0  ah   wh2 Lhf 00  ah
v00 (Lh) + (wh)2 f 00 (ah)
@wh
@w`
 n 1
w`L`
w`

1  f 0  a`   w`2 L`f 00  a`
v00 (L`) + (w`)2 f 00 (a`)
: (A15)
Introducing the notation
	j  v00  Lj+  wj2 f 00  aj > 0; for j = `; h (A16)
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and recalling the denition of j (for j = `; h) provided by (13), one can rewrite
(A15) as
@n
@w`
= n
(
1
whLh
"
wh

1  f 0  ah
	h
  Lhh
#
@wh
@w`
  1
w`L`
"
w`

1  f 0  a`
	`
  L``
#)
= n
("
1  f 0  ah
Lh	h
  
h
wh
#
@wh
@w`
 
"
1  f 0  a`
L`	`
  
`
w`
#)
: (A17)
To further simplify (A17), observe that,
@wh
@w`
=
@wh=@n
@w`=@n
=
p00 (n)
p0 (n)  p0 (n)  np00 (n) =
 1
n
; (A18)
where @wh=@n and @w`=@n are found from di¤erentiating relationships (4)(3).
Substituting in (A17) and further simplication results in
@n
@w`
=  
"
1  f 0  ah
Lh	h
+ n
1  f 0  a`
L`	`
  
h
wh
  n
`
w`
#
: (A19)
 The e¤ects of a change in Bj ; Bk;M j ;Mk; wj, and wk on V j  V  M j ; Bj ;wj
and V jk  V  Mk; Bk;wj. Recall that V (M;B;w) denotes the maximum value
function of problem (5) with the associated notation V j  V  M j ; Bj ;wj and
V jk  V  Mk; Bk;wj. Invoking the envelop theorem, we have, for all j = h; `;
@V j
@Bj
= 1; (A20)
@V jk
@Bk
= 1; (A21)
@V j
@M j
=   1  f 0  aj (A22)
@V jk
@Mk
=  
h
1  f 0

ajk
i
; (A23)
@V j
@wj
= Lj

1  f 0  aj ; (A24)
@V jk
@wj
= Ljk
h
1  f 0

ajk
i
: (A25)
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Step (ii): Proof of the negativity of . We have,
@L
@w`
= (1 + )
@V h
@wh
@wh
@w`
+ 
@V `
@w`
  @V
h`
@wh
@wh
@w`
+

w`N `
@L`
@w`
+ whNh
@Lh
@wh
@wh
@w`
 N ` @a
`
@w`
 Nh @a
h
@wh
@wh
@w`

+

1  g0 @n
@w`

;
= (1 + )Lh
h
1  f 0

ah
i  1
n
+ L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
  Lh`
h
1  f 0

ah`
i  1
n
+

w`N `
@L`
@w`
+ whNh
@Lh
@wh
 1
n
 N `

L` + w`
@L`
@w`

 Nh

Lh + wh
@Lh
@wh
  1
n

+

1  g0 @n
@w`

;
= (1 + )Lh
h
1  f 0

ah
i  1
n
+ L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
  Lh`
h
1  f 0

ah`
i  1
n
+

 N `

L`

 Nh

Lh
  1
n

+

1  g0 @n
@w`

;
= (1 + )Lh
h
1  f 0

ah
i  1
n
+ L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
  Lh`
h
1  f 0

ah`
i  1
n
+

1  g0 @n
@w`

: (A26)
The expressions involving  and  in (A26) can also be simplied. Multiply (A32) by
1  f 0  ahLh=n, multiply (A38) by L` 1  f 0  a`, and add the resulting equations
together:h
1 +   Nh
i  Lh
n
h
1  f 0

ah
i
+
h
  N `   
i
L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
= 0:
Moving all the expressions involving  to the right-hand side,
(1 + )
 Lh
n
h
1  f 0

ah
i
+ (  )L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
= N `L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
 N
hLh
n
h
1  f 0

ah
i
= N `L`
h
f 0

ah

  f 0

a`
i
Or
(1 + )
 Lh
n
h
1  f 0

ah
i
+L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
= L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
+N `L`
h
f 0

ah

  f 0

a`
i
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Then substitute it in (A26) to get
@L
@w`
= L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
+ N `L`
h
f 0

ah

  f 0

a`
i
+ 
Lh`
n
h
1  f 0

ah`
i
+

1  g0 @n
@w`


= 

L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
+
Lh`
n
h
1  f 0

ah`
i
+

1  g0 @n
@w`

+ N `L`
h
f 0

ah

  f 0

a`
i
(A27)
Now observe, from (10), that f 0
 
aj

= T 0
 
M j

where the values of T 0
 
Mh

and
T 0
 
M `

are given by (11) and (12). Substituting these values in the last expression of
(A27), we have
@L
@w`
= 

L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
+
Lh`
n
h
1  f 0

ah`
i
+

1  g0 @n
@w`


+N `L`

h
ng0
whNhLh
  
N `

MRS`MB  MRSh`MB

+ `
ng0
w`N `L`

Substituting the expression for @n=@w` from (A19) into above and simplifying,
@L
@w`
= 

L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
+
Lh`
n
h
1  f 0

ah`
i
+(
1 + g0
"
1  f 0  ah
Lh	h
+ n
1  f 0  a`
L`	`
  
h
wh
  n
`
w`
#)
+
h
g0
wh
  L`

MRS`MB  MRSh`MB

+ `
ng0
w`

= 

L`
h
1  f 0

a`
i
+
Lh`
n
h
1  f 0

ah`
i
+(
1 + g0
"
1
Lh
1  f 0  ah
	h
+ n
1
L`
1  f 0  a`
	`
#)
  L`

MRS`MB  MRSh`MB

:
Finally, substituting MRS`MB for 1   f 0
 
a`

, MRSh`MB for 1   f 0
 
ah`

, and MRSh`MB
for 1  f 0  ah` in above results in
@L
@w`
= 

L`MRS`MB +
Lh`
n
MRSh`MB

+

1 + g0

MRShMB
Lh	h
+ n
MRS`MB
L`	`


 L`

MRS`MB  MRSh`MB

: (A28)
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Setting @L=@w` = 0 in (A28), one ends up with the following expression for ,
 =  


Lh`
n + L
`

MRSh`MB
1 +

MRShMB
Lh	h
+
MRS`MB
L`	`
n

g0
; (A29)
where 	j > 0 was dened in (A16).
With g0 = p0   p0   np00 =  np00 > 0, it follows that  < 0:
Proof of Proposition 1: We do this in two steps.
Step (i): Proof of equation (11). The rst-order conditions of the governments
problem, summarized by the Lagrangian (8), with respect to Bh and Mh are:
@V h
@Bh
+ 

Ph
Nh
wh
@ah
@Bh
 Nh  Nh @a
h
@Bh

+ 
@V h
@Bh
  g0 @n
@Bh
= 0; (A30)
@V h
@Mh
+ 

Ph
Nh
wh

1 +
@ah
@Mh

 Nh @a
h
@Mh

+ 
@V h
@Mh
  g0 @n
@Mh
= 0: (A31)
Set Ph = wh and substitute from (A7)(A8), (A11)(A12), (A20) and (A22) in (A30)
(A31). Simplify and rearrange the terms to rewrite equations (A30)(A31) as
1 +  = Nh; (A32)
(1 + )
@V h
@Mh
=
n
Lh
whf 00
 
ah

v00 (Lh) + (wh)2 f 00 (ah)
g0   Nh: (A33)
Substitute for 1 +  from (A32) into (A33) to get
Nh

1 +
@V h
@Mh

=
n
Lh
whf 00
 
ah

v00 (Lh) + (wh)2 f 00 (ah)
g0: (A34)
Using the denition of the marginal income tax rate in (9), one can rewrite (A34) as,
T 0

Mh

=
whf 00
 
ah

v00 (Lh) + (wh)2 f 00 (ah)
ng0
NhLh
; (A35)
which, using the denition of h, is identical to (11).
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Step (ii): Proof of equation (12). The rst-order conditions of the governments
problem with respect to B` and M ` are:

@V `
@B`
+ 

P`
N `
w`
@a`
@B`
 N `  N ` @a
`
@B`

  @V
h`
@B`
  g0 @n
@B`
= 0; (A36)

@V `
@M `
+ 

P`
N `
w`

1 +
@a`
@M `

 N ` @a
`
@M `

  @V
h`
@M `
  g0 @n
@M `
= 0: (A37)
set P` = w` and substitute from (A7)(A8), (A13)(A14), and (A20)(A23) into (A36)
(A37). Simplify and rearrange the terms to rewrite equations (A36)(A37) as,
 = N ` + ; (A38)

@V `
@M `
=  N ` + @V
h`
@M `
  ng
0
L`
w`f 00
 
a`

v00 (L`) + (w`)2 f 00 (a`)
: (A39)
Substitute for  from (A38) into (A39) and rearrange the terms to get,
N `

1 +
@V `
@M `

= 

@V h`
@M `
  @V
`
@M `

  ng
0
L`
w`f 00
 
a`

v00 (L`) + (w`)2 f 00 (a`)
:
Using the denition of the marginal income tax rate in (9), one can rewrite the above
equation as
T 0

M `

=
1
N `
"


@V h`
@M `
  @V
`
@M `

  ng
0
L`
w`f 00
 
a`

v00 (L`) + (w`)2 f 00 (a`)
#
=

N `

MRS`MB  MRSh`MB

  w
`f 00
 
a`

v00 (L`) + (w`)2 f 00 (a`)
ng0
N `L`
; (A40)
which, using the denition of `, is identical to (12).
Derivation of equations (14)(15). In the absence of tax evasion, the govern-
ments problem continues to be summarized by the Lagrangian (8) except that in this
case a = 0. Nor is there the taxpayers optimization problem (5) and the associated
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rst-order condition (6). The rst-order conditions of the governments problem with
respect to Bh;Mh; B`, and M `, equations (A30)(A31) and (A36)(A37), simplify to
@V h
@Bh
  Nh + @V
h
@Bh
  g0 @n
@Bh
= 0; (A41)
@V h
@Mh
+ Nh + 
@V h
@Mh
  g0 @n
@Mh
= 0;

@V `
@B`
  N `   @V
h`
@B`
  g0 @n
@B`
= 0; (A42)

@V `
@M `
+ N `   @V
h`
@M `
  g0 @n
@M `
= 0: (A43)
As previously with tax evasion, the expressions for @V j=@Bj ; @V h`=@B`; @V j=@M j , and
@V h`=@M `, for j = h; `, are given by equations (A20)(A23). Similarly, we continue
to have @n=@Bh = @n=@B` = 0 but the expressions for @n=@Mh and @n=@M ` now
simplify to:
@n
@Mh
=
@
wh@Lh

NhLh
N `L`

=
Nh
whN `L`
=
n
whLh
;
@n
@M `
=
NhLh
N `
@
w`@L`

1
L`

=
NhLh
w`N `
 1
(L`)
2 =
 n
w`L`
:
Substituting all these expressions in (A41)(A43) they simplify to,
1 +  = Nh;
(1 + )
@V h
@Mh
+ Nh = g0
n
whLh
;
 = N ` + ;

@V `
@M `
+ N `   @V
h`
@M `
  g0
  n
w`L`

= 0:
Eliminating 1 +  between the rst two equations and  between the last equations
yield,
Nh

1 +
@V h
@Mh

= g0
n
whLh
;
N `

1 +
@V `
@M `

= 

@V h`
@M `
  @V
`
@M `

  g0
 n
w`L`

:
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Then, from the denitions of the marginal income tax rates and the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and income, one can rewrite the above equations as
equations (14)(15) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2. With R being endogenously determined, the optimization
problem (5) is amended as
V (M;B;R;w) 

max
L
U = wL M +B   f (wL M;R)  v (L)

;
so that, from the envelope theorem, we have
@V j
@R
=  fR
 
aj ; R

; (A44)
@V jk
@R
=  fR

ajk; R

: (A45)
Substituting for @V h=@R; @V `=@R, and @V h`=@R, from equations (A44)(A45), into
the rst-order condition (16) in the text, we have
  (1 + ) fR

ah; R

 fR

a`; R

+fR

ah`; R

 

N ` +Nh

 g0 @n
@R
 0; (A46)
From (A32), substituting Nh for (1 + ), and from (A38) substituting
 
N ` + 

for
, one gets
 NhfR

ah; R

 

N ` + 

fR

a`; R

+fR

ah`; R

 

N ` +Nh

 g0 @n
@R
 0:
Rearranging the terms and focusing on the case of an interior optimum (i.e. the case
where the optimal value of R is non-zero), we have

h
fR

ah`; R

  fR

a`; R
i
 g0 @n
@R
= 
h
Nh

1 + fR

ah; R

+N `

1 + fR

a`; R
i
:
(A47)
To show that relationship (A47) reduces to condition (17) in the text, we have to
prove that
@n
@R
=  
"
whfaR
 
ah; R

Lh	h
  w
`faR
 
a`; R

L`	`
#
n: (A48)
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To do so, di¤erentiate n  NhLh=N `L` with respect to R to get
@n
@R
=
Nh
N `
"
L` @L
h
@R   Lh @L
`
@R
(L`)
2
#
= n

1
Lh
@Lh
@R
  1
L`
@L`
@R

: (A49)
To determine @Lh=@R and @L`=@R, observe that the equivalent of equation (6) when
R is a choice variable by the government is given by,
v0 (L) = w [1  fa (wL M;R)] :
Partially di¤erentiate this relationship with respect R and rearrange the terms to get,
@L
@R
=
 wfaR (a;R)
v00 (L) + w2faa (a;R)
=
 wfaR (a;R)
	
: (A50)
Substituting from (A50) for @Lh=@R and @L`=@R into (A49) results in (A48).
Finally, to determine the sign of 
 =   (@n=@R)g0, recall that  < 0 and g0 > 0.
As to the sign of @n=@R, our assumptions on v () and f (; ) ensure that v00 (L) +
w2faa (a;R) > 0. Moreover, the assumption that fR (a;R) is increasing in the absolute
value of a, and the fact that ah < 0 and a` > 0, imply faR
 
ah; R

< 0 and faR
 
a`; R

>
0. Hence the bracketed expression on the right-hand side of (A48) is negative implying
that @n=@R > 0. Consequently, 
 > 0:
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Table 1. Optimal marginal income tax rates with and without evasion
Without evasion With evasion:  = 1
Skill-type MITR wage utility MITR wage utility
`1 31.01% 0.355 1.115 28.09% 0.305 1.283
`2 42.98% 0.391 1.082 32.01% 0.336 1.243
h1 18.82% 0.732 0.970 14.01% 0.757 0.947
h2 3.52% 1.020 0.737 2.62% 1.059 0.657
Utilitarian Social Welfare = 0.976 Utilitarian Social Welfare = 1.032
Table 2. Optimal marginal income tax rates with and without government
ghting evasion
 = :1: Evasion is not fought  = :1: Evasion is fought
Skill-type MITR wage utility MITR wage utility
`1 2.86% 0.163 2.103 29.11% 0.295 1.384
`2 3.18% 0.179 2.028 32.42% 0.325 1.341
h1 4.11% 0.846 0.702 13.49% 0.762 0.993
h2 2.03% 1.184 0.377 2.65% 1.067 0.681
Utilitarian Social Welfare = 1.302 Utilitarian Social Welfare = 1.101
Table 3. Income-dependent R with  = :1
Skill-type MITR wage utility Rj
`1 31.31% 0.308 1.343 3.987
`2 34.73% 0.339 1.303 4.265
h1 7.09% 0.755 1.016 0.905
h2 0.05% 1.058 0.657 0
Utilitarian Social Welfare = 1.079
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Table 4. Optimal marginal income tax rates with and without evasion
Without evasion With evasion:  = 1
Skill-type MITR wage utility MITR wage utility
`1 81.44% 0.582 1.054 42.80% 0.361 1.229
`2 65.65% 0.640 1.047 46.75% 0.397 1.196
h1 35.39% 0.640 1.047 25.71% 0.729 1.012
h2 20.86% 0.896 0.877 11.79% 1.020 0.754
Maxi-min Social Welfare = 1.054 Maxi-min Social Welfare = 1.229
Table 5. Optimal marginal income tax rates with and without government
ghting evasion
 = :1: Evasion is not fought  = :1: Evasion is fought
Skill-type MITR wage utility MITR wage utility
`1 2.87% 0.164 2.102 62.97% 0.459 1.284
`2 3.19% 0.180 2.027 66.96% 0.504 1.258
h1 5.23% 0.845 0.702 31.16% 0.686 1.187
h2 2.62% 1.183 0.381 8.12% 0.961 0.927
Maxi-min Social Welfare = 2.102 Maxi-min Social Welfare = 1.284
Table 6. Income-dependent R with  = :1
Skill-type MITR wage utility Rj
`1 65.03% 0.476 1.252 6.29
`2 69.13% 0.523 1.228 6.73
h1 28.07% 0.679 1.174 3.61
h2 1.32% 0.951 0.901 0
Maxi-min Social Welfare = 1.252
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